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Two fundamental problems in computational game theory are computing a Nash equilibrium and learning
to exploit opponents given observations of their play (opponent exploitation). e laer is perhaps even
more important than the former: Nash equilibrium does not have a compelling theoretical justication in
game classes other than two-player zero-sum, and for all games one can potentially do beer by exploiting
perceived weaknesses of the opponent than by following a static equilibrium strategy throughout the match.
e natural seing for opponent exploitation is the Bayesian seing where we have a prior model that is
integrated with observations to create a posterior opponent model that we respond to. e most natural, and
a well-studied prior distribution is the Dirichlet distribution. An exact polynomial-time algorithm is known
for best-responding to the posterior distribution for an opponent assuming a Dirichlet prior with multinomial
sampling in normal-form games; however, for imperfect-information games the best known algorithm is based
on approximating an innite integral without theoretical guarantees. We present the rst exact algorithm for
a natural class of imperfect-information games. We demonstrate that our algorithm runs quickly in practice
and outperforms the best prior approaches. We also present an algorithm for the uniform prior seing.
1 INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are playing a game repeatedly against one or more opponents. What algorithm should
you use to maximize your performance? e classic “solution concept” in game theory is the
Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium σ , each player is simultaneously maximizing his payo
assuming the opponents all follow their components of σ . So should we just nd a Nash equilibrium
strategy for ourselves and play it in all the game iterations?
Unfortunately, there are some complications. First, there can exist many Nash equilibria, and if
the opponents are not following the same one that we have found (or are not following one at all),
then our strategy would have no performance guarantees. Second, nding a Nash equilibrium is
challenging computationally: it is PPAD-hard and is widely conjectured that no polynomial-time
algorithms exist [Chen and Deng, 2006]. ese challenges apply to both extensive-form games (of
both perfect and imperfect information) and strategic-form games, for games with more than two
players and non-zero-sum games. While a particular Nash equilibrium may happen to perform
well in practice,1 there is no theoretically compelling justication for why computing one and
playing it repeatedly is a good approach. Two-player zero-sum games do not face these challenges:
there exist polynomial-time algorithms for computing an equilibrium [Koller et al., 1994], and there
exists a game value that is guaranteed in expectation in the worst case by all equilibrium strategies
regardless of the strategy played by the opponent (and this value is the best worst-case guaranteed
payo for any of our strategies). However, even for this game class it would be desirable to deviate
from equilibrium in order to learn and exploit perceived weaknesses of the opponent; for instance,
if the opponent has played Rock in each of the rst thousand iterations of rock-paper-scissors, it
seems desirable to put additional weight on paper beyond the equilibrium value of 13 .
us, learning to exploit opponents’ weaknesses is desirable in all game classes. One approach
would be to construct an opponent model consisting of a single mixed strategy that we believe the
opponent is playing given our observations of his play and a prior distribution (perhaps computed
1An agent for 3-player limit Texas hold ’em computed by the counterfactual regret minimization algorithm (which converges
to Nash equilibrium in certain games) performed well in practice despite a lack of theoretical justication [Gibson, 2014].
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from a database of historical play). is approach has been successfully applied to exploit weak
agents in limit Texas hold ’em poker, a large imperfect-information game [Ganzfried and Sandholm,
2011].2 A drawback is that it is potentially not robust. It is very unlikely that the opponent’s
strategy matches this point estimate exactly, and we could perform poorly if our model is incorrect.
A more robust approach, which is the natural one to use in this seing, is to use a Bayesian
model, where the prior and posterior are full distributions over mixed strategies of the opponent,
not single mixed strategies. A natural prior distribution, which has been studied and applied in
this context, is the Dirichlet distribution. e pdf of the Dirichlet distribution is the belief that
the probabilities of K rival events are xi given that each event has been observed αi − 1 times:
f (x ,α) = 1B(α )
∏
xαi−1i .
3 Some notable properties are that the mean is E[Xi ] = αi∑
k αk
and that,
assuming multinomial sampling, the posterior aer including new observations is also Dirichlet,
with parameters updated based on the new observations.
Prior work has presented an ecient algorithm for optimally exploiting an opponent in normal-
form games in the Bayesian seing with a Dirichlet prior [Fudenberg and Levine, 1998]. e
algorithm is essentially the ctitious play rule [Brown, 1951]. Given prior counts αi for each
opponent action, the algorithm increments the counter for an action by one each time it is observed,
and then best responds to a model for the opponent where he plays each strategy in proportion
to the counters. is algorithm would also extend directly to sequential extensive-form games of
perfect information, where we maintain independent counters at each of the opponent’s decision
nodes; this would also work for games of imperfect information where the opponent’s private
information is observed aer each round of play (so that we would know exactly what information
set he took the observed action from). For all of these game classes the algorithm would apply
to both zero and general-sum games, for any number of players. However, it would not apply to
imperfect-information games where the opponent’s private information is not observed aer play.
An algorithm exists for approximating a Bayesian best response in imperfect-information games,
which uses importance sampling to approximate an innite integral. is algorithm has been
successfully applied to limit Texas hold ’em poker [Southey et al., 2005].4 However, it is only a
heuristic approach with no guarantees. e authors state,
“Computing the integral over opponent strategies depends on the form of the
prior but is dicult in any event. For Dirichlet priors, it is possible to compute
the posterior exactly but the calculation is expensive except for small games with
relatively few observations. is makes the exact BBR an ideal goal rather than a
practical approach. For real play, we must consider approximations to BBR.”
However, we see no justication for the claim that it is possible to compute the posterior exactly in
prior work, and there could easily be no closed-form solution. In this paper we present a solution
for this problem, leading to the rst exact optimal algorithm for performing Bayesian opponent
exploitation in imperfect-information games. While the claim is correct that the computation is
expensive for large games, we show that in a small (yet realistic) game it outperforms all prior
approaches. Furthermore, we show that the computation can run extremely quickly even for large
number of observations (though it can run into numerical instability), contradicting the second
claim. We also present general theory, and an algorithm for another natural prior distribution
(uniform distribution over a polyhedron).
2is approach used an approximate Nash equilibrium strategy as the prior and is applicable even when historical data is
not available, though if additional data were available a more informed prior that capitalizes on the data would be preferable.
3B(α ) is the beta function B(α ) =
∏
Γ(αi )
Γ(∑i αi ) , where Γ(n) = (n − 1)! is the gamma function.4In addition to Bayesian Best Response, the paper also considers heuristic approaches for approximating several other
response functions: Max A Posteriori Response and ompson’s Response.
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2 META-ALGORITHM
e problem of developing ecient algorithms for optimizing against a posterior distribution,
which is a probability distribution over mixed strategies for the opponent (which are themselves
distributions over pure strategies) seems daunting. We need to be able to compactly represent the
posterior distribution and eciently compute a best response to it. Fortunately, we show that our
payo of playing any strategy σi against a probability distribution over mixed strategies for the
opponent equals our payo of playing σi against the mean of the distribution. us, we need only
represent and respond to the single strategy that is the mean of the distribution, and not to the full
distribution. While this result was likely known previously, we have not seen it stated explicitly,
and it is important enough to be highlighted so that it is on the radar of the AI community.
Suppose the opponent is playing mixed strategy σ−i where σ−i (s−j ) is the probability that he plays
pure strategy s−j ∈ S−j . By denition of expected utility, ui (σi ,σ−i ) = ∑s−j ∈S−j σ−i (s−j )ui (σi , s−j ).
We can generalize this naturally to the case where the opponent is playing according to a
probability distribution with pdf f−i over mixed strategies:
ui (σi , f−i ) =
∫
σ−i ∈Σ−i
[f−i (σ−i ) · ui (σi ,σ−i )] .
Let f−i denote the mean of f−i . at is, f−i is the mixed strategy that selects s−j with probability∫
σ−i ∈Σ−i
[
σ−i (s−j ) · f−i (σ−i )
]
.
en we have the following:
Theorem 2.1.
ui (σi , f−i ) = ui (σi , f−i ).
at is, the payo against the mean of a strategy distribution equals the payo against the full distribution.
Proof.
ui (σi , f−i )
=
∑
s−j ∈S−j
[
ui (σi , s−j )
∫
σ−i ∈Σ−i
[
σ−i (s−j ) · f−i (σ−i )
] ]
=
∑
s−j ∈S−j
[∫
σ−i ∈Σ−i
[
ui (σi , s−j ) · σ−i (s−j ) · f−i (σ−i )
] ]
=
∫
σ−i ∈Σ−i

∑
j ∈S−j
[
ui (σi , s−j ) · σ−i (s−j ) · f−i (σ−i )
]
=
∫
σ−i ∈Σ−i
[ui (σi ,σ−i ) · f−i (σ−i )]
= ui (σi , f−i )

eorem 2.1 applies to both normal and extensive-form games (with perfect or imperfect infor-
mation), for any number of players (σ−i could be a joint strategy prole for all opposing agents).
Now suppose the opponent is playing according a prior distribution p(σ−i ), and let p(σ−i |x)
denote the posterior probability given observations x . Let p(σ−i |x) denote the mean of p(σ−i |x). As
an immediate consequence of eorem 2.1, we have the following corollary.
Sam Ganzfried and Qingyun Sun 4
Corollary 2.2. ui (σi ,p(σ−i |x)) = ui (σi ,p(σ−i |x)).
Corollary 2.2 implies the meta-procedure for optimizing performance against an opponent who
uses p given by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Meta-algorithm for Bayesian opponent exploitation
Inputs: Prior distribution p0, response functions rt for 0 ≤ t ≤ T
M0 ← p0(σ−i )
R0 ← r0(M0)
Play according to R0
for t = 1 to T do
xt ← observations of opponent’s play at time step t
pt ← posterior distribution of opponent’s strategy given prior pt−1 and observations xt
Mt ← mean of pt
Rt ← rt (Mt )
Play according to Rt
ere are several challenges for applying Algorithm 1. First, it assumes that we can compactly
represent the prior and posterior distributions pt , which have innite domain (the set of opponents’
mixed strategy proles). Second, it requires a procedure to eciently compute the posterior
distributions given the prior and the observations, which requires updating potentially innitely
many strategies. ird, it requires an ecient procedure to compute the mean of pt . And fourth, it
requires that the full posterior distribution from one round be compactly represented to be used as
the prior in the next round. We can address the fourth challenge by using a modied update step:
pt ← posterior distribution of opponent’s strategy given prior p0 and observations x1, . . . ,xt .
We will be using this new rule in our main algorithm.
e response functions rt could be standard best response, for which linear-time algorithms
exist in games of imperfect information (and a recent approach has enabled ecient computation
in extremely large games [Johanson et al., 2011]). It could also be a more robust response, e.g.,
one that places a limit on the exploitability of our own strategy, perhaps one that varies over time
based on our performance (or a lower-variance estimator of it) [Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2015,
Johanson and Bowling, 2009, Johanson et al., 2007]. In particular, the restricted Nash response
has been demonstrated to outperform best response against agents in limit Texas hold ’em whose
actual strategy may dier substantially from the exact model [Johanson et al., 2007].
3 ROBUSTNESS OF THE APPROACH
It has been pointed out that, empirically, the approach described is not robust: if we play a full
best response to a point estimate of the opponent’s strategy we can have very high exploitability
ourselves, and could perform very poorly if in fact we are wrong about our model [Johanson et al.,
2007]. is could happen for several reasons. Our modeling algorithm could be incorrect: it could
make an incorrect assumption about the prior and form of the opponent’s distribution. is could
happen for several reasons. One reason is that the opponent could actually be changing his strategy
over time (possibly either by improving his own play or by adapting to our play), in which case a
model that assumes a static opponent could be predicting a strategy that the opponent is no longer
using. e opponent could also have modied his play strategically in an aempt to deceive us
by playing one way initially and then counter-exploiting us as we aempt to exploit the model
we have formed from his initial strategy (e.g., the opponent initially starts o playing extremely
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conservatively, then switches to a more aggressive style as he suspects we will start to exploit
his extreme conservatism). His initial strategy need not arise from deception: it is also possible
that simply due to chance events (either due to his own randomization in his strategy or due to
the states of private information selected by chance) the opponent has appeared to be playing in
a certain way (e.g., very conservatively), and as he becomes aware of this conservative “image,”
naturally it occurs to him to modify his play by becoming more aggressive.
A second reason that we could be wrong in our opponent model other than our modeling
algorithm incorrectly modeling the opponents’ dynamic approach is that our observations of his
play are very noisy (due to both randomization in the opponent’s strategy and to the private
information selected by chance), particularly over a small sample. Even if our approach is correct
and the opponent is in fact playing a static strategy according to the distribution assumed by the
modeling algorithm, it is very unlikely that our actual perception of his strategy is precisely correct.
A third reason, of course, is that the opponent may be following a static strategy that does not
exactly conform to our model for the prior and/or sampling method used to generate the posterior.
We would like an approach that is robust in the event that our model of the opponent’s strategy
is incorrect, whichever the cause may be. Prior work has considered a model where the opponent
plays according to a model x−i with probability p and with probability 1 − p plays a nemesis to our
strategy [Johanson et al., 2007]. For carefully selected values of p (typically 0.95 or 0.99), they show
that this can achieve a relatively high level of exploitation (similar to a full best response) with a
signicantly smaller worst-case exploitability. We note that, as described in Section 2, Algorithm 1
can be integrated with any response function, not necessarily a full best response, and so rt could
be selected to be the Restricted Nash Response from prior work [Johanson et al., 2007]. However,
it seems excessively conservative to give the opponent credit for playing a full nemesis to our
strategy; if we are relatively condent in our opponent model, then a more reasonable robustness
criterion would be to explore performance as we allow the opponent’s strategy to dier by a small
amount from the predicted strategy (i.e., the opponent is playing a strategy that is very close to our
model, and not necessarily puing weight on a full nemesis to our strategy).
Suppose we believe the opponent is playing x−i , while he is actually playing x ′−i . Let M be the
maximum absolute value of a utility to player i , and let N be the maximum number of actions
available to a player. Let ϵ > 0 be arbitrary. en, if |x−i (j) − x ′−i (j)| < δ for all j, where δ = ϵMN ,
|ui (σ ∗,x−i ) − ui (σ ∗,x ′−i )| =
∑
j
(x−i (j) − x ′−i (j))ui (σ ∗, s−j )

<=
∑
j
 (x−i (j) − x ′−i (j)) ui (σ ∗, s−j ) <= ∑
j
(x−i (j) − x ′−i (j) · ui (σ ∗, s−j ))
<=
∑
j
( |x−i (j) − x ′−i (j)| ·M ) < M ∑
j
δ <= MNδ = MN · ϵ
MN
= ϵ
is same analysis can be applied directly to show that our payo is continuous in the opponent’s
strategy for many popular distance functions (i.e., for any distance function where one strategy
can get arbitrarily close to another as the components get arbitrarily close). For instance this
would apply to L1, L2, and earth mover’s distance, which have been applied previously to compute
distances been strategies within opponent exploitation algorithms [Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2011].
us, if we are slightly o in our model of the opponent’s strategy, even if we are doing a full best
response we will do only slightly worse.
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4 EXPLOITATION ALGORITHM FOR DIRICHLET PRIOR
As described in Section 1 the Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior for the multinomial
distribution, and therefore the posterior is also a Dirichlet distribution, with the parameters αi
updated to reect the new observations. us, the mean of the posterior can be computed eciently
by computing the strategy for the opponent in which he plays each strategy in proportion to the
updated weight, and Algorithm 1 yields an exact ecient algorithm for computing the Bayesian
best response in normal-form games with a Dirichlet prior. However, the algorithm does not
apply to games of imperfect information since we do not observe the private information held
by the opponent, and therefore do not know which of his action counters we should increment.
In this section we will present a new algorithm for this seing. We present it in the context of a
representative motivating game where the opponent is dealt a state of private information and then
takes publicly-observable action. and present the algorithm for the general seing in Section 4.3.
We are interested in studying the following two-player game seing. Player 1 is given private
information state xi (according to a probability distribution). en he takes a publicly observable
action ai . Player 2 then takes an action aer observing player 1’s action (but not his private
information), and both players receive a payo. We are interested in player 2’s problem of inferring
the (assumed stationary) strategy of player 1 aer repeated observations of the public action taken
(but not the private information). Note that this seing is very general. For example, in poker xi
could denote the opponent’s private card(s) and ai the amount bet, and in an ad auction xi could
denote his valuation (e.g., high or low), and ai could denote the amount he bids [Tang et al., 2016].
4.1 Motivating game and algorithm
For concreteness and motivation, consider the following poker game instantiation of this seing,
where we play the role of player 2. Let’s assume that in this two-player game, player 1 is dealt a
King (K) and Jack (J) with probability 12 , while player 2 is always dealt a een. Player 1 is allowed
to make a big bet of $10 (b) or a small bet of $1 (s), and player 2 is allowed to call or fold. If player 2
folds, then player 1 wins the $2 pot (for a prot of $1); if player 1 bets and player 2 calls then the
player with the higher card wins the $2 pot plus the size of the bet.
Fig. 1. Chance deals player 1 king or jack with probability 12 at the green node. Then player 1 selects big or
small bet at a red node. Then player 2 chooses call or fold at a blue node.
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If we observe player 1’s card aer each hand, then we can apply the approach described above,
where we maintain a counter for player 1 choosing each action with each card that is incremented
for the selected action. However, if we do not observe player 1’s card aer the hand (e.g., if we
fold), then we would not know whether to increment the counter for the king or the jack.
To simplify analysis, we will assume that we never observe the opponent’s private card aer
the hand (which is not realistic since we would observe his card if he bets and we call); we can
assume that we do not observe our payo either until all game iterations are complete, since that
could allow us to draw inferences about the opponent’s card. ere are no known algorithms even
for the simplied case of fully unobservable opponent’s private information. We suspect that an
algorithm for the case when the opponent’s private information is sometimes observed can be
constructed based on our algorithm, and we plan to study this problem in future work.
Let C denote player 1’s card and A denote his action. en P(C = K) = P(C = J ) = 12 .
Let qb |K ≡ P(A = b |C = K) denote the probability that player 1 makes a big bet with king,
qs |K ≡ P(A = s |C = K) denote the probability that player 1 makes a small bet with king, then
qs |K = 1 − qs |K . If we were using a Dirichlet prior with parameters α1 and α2, denoted Dir(α1,α2),
(where α1 − 1 is the number of times that action b has been observed with a king and α2 − 1 is the
number of times s has been observed with a king), then the probability density function is
fDir(qb |K ,qs |K ;α1,α2) =
(qα1−1b |K )(qs |K )α2−1
B(α1,α2) =
(qα1−1b |K )(1 − qb |K )α2−1
B(α1,α2)
In general given observations O, Bayes’ rule gives the following, where q is a mixed strategy that is
given mass p(q) under the prior, and p(q |O) is the posterior:
p(q |O) = P(O |q)p(q)
P(O)
=
∑
c ∈C P(O,C = c |q)p(q)
p(O)
=
∑
c P(O |C = c,q)p(c)p(q)
p(O)
=
(P(O |K ,q)p(K) + P(O |J ,q)p(J ))p(q)
p(O)
=
(P(O |K ,q) + P(O |J ,q))p(q)
2p(O)
=
qO |Kp(q) + qO | Jp(q)
2p(O)
Assume action b was observed in a new time step but player 1’s card was not. Let αKb − 1 be the
number of times we observed him play b with K according to the prior, etc.
P (q |O ) =
q
αKb
b |K (1 − qb |K )αKs −1q
αJb−1
b | J (1 − qb | J )
αJ s −1 + qαKb−1b |K (1 − qb |K )αKs −1q
αJb
b | J (1 − qb | J )
αJ s −1
2B(αKb , αKs )B(α Jb , α J s )p(O )
e general expression for the mean of a continuous random variable is
E[X ] =
∫
x
xP(X = x)dx =
∫
x
x
∫
y
p(X ,Y )dydx
=
∫
x
∫
y
xp(X ,Y )dydx
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Now we compute the mean of the posterior of the opponent’s probability of playing b with J.
P (A = b |O, C = J )
=
∫
qb | J
qb | J P (qb | J |O )dqb | J
=
∫
qb | J
∫
qb |K
qb | J P (q |O )dqb |Kdqb | J
p(O )
=
∫ ∫
(qαKbb |K (1 − qb |K )αKs−1q
α Jb
b | J (1 − qb | J )α J s−1 + q
αKb−1
b |K (1 − qb |K )αKs−1q
α Jb+1
b | J (1 − qb | J )α J s−1)dqb |Kdqb | J
2B(αKb, αKs )B(α Jb, α J s )p(O )
=
B(αKb + 1, αKs )B(α Jb + 1, α J s ) + B(αKb, αKs )B(α Jb + 2, α J s )
2B(αKb, αKs )B(α Jb, α J s )p(O )
=
B(αKb + 1, αKs )B(α Jb + 1, α J s ) + B(αKb, αKs )B(α Jb + 2, α J s )
Z
e nal equation can be obtained by observing that∫
qb | J
∫
qb |K
qαKbb |K (1 − qb |K )αKs−1q
α Jb
b | J (1 − qb | J )α J s−1
B(αKb + 1,αKs )B(α Jb + 1,α J s ) dqb |Kdqb | J
=
∫
qb | J
q
α Jb
b | J (1 − qb | J )α J s−1
B(α Jb + 1,b J )
∫
qb |K
qαKbb |K (1 − qb |K )αKs−1
B(αKb + 1,αKs ) dqb |Kdqb | J
=
∫
qb | J
q
α Jb
b | J (1 − qb | J )α J s−1
B(α Jb + 1,α J s ) 1dqb | J = 1,
since the integrands are themselves Dirichlet and all probability distributions integrate to 1. Simi-
larly ∫ ∫ (qαKb−1b |K (1 − qb |K )αKs−1qα Jb+1b | J (1 − qb | J )α J s−1)
B(αKb ,αKs )B(α Jb + 2,α J s ) = 1.
Leing Z denote the denominator, we have
P(b |O, J ) = B(αKb + 1,αKs )B(α Jb + 1,α J s ) + B(αKb ,αKs )B(α Jb + 2,α J s )
Z
(1)
where the normalization term Z is equal to
B(αKb + 1,αKs )B(α Jb + 1,α J s ) + B(αKb ,αKs )B(α Jb + 2,α J s )
+B(αKb + 1,αKs )B(α Jb ,α J s + 1) + B(αKb ,αKs )B(α Jb + 1,α J s + 1)
P(s |O, J ), P(b |O,K), and P(s |O,K) can be computed analogously. As stated earlier, B(α) =
∏
Γ(αi )
Γ(∑i αi )
where Γ(n) = (n − 1)!, which can be computed eciently.
Note that the algorithm we have presented applies for the case where we play one more game
iteration and collect one additional observation. However, it is problematic for the general case
we are interested in where we play many game iterations, since the posterior distribution is not
Dirichlet, and therefore we cannot just apply the same procedure in the next iteration using the
computed posterior as the new prior. We will need to derive a new expression for P(b |O, J ) for this
seing. Suppose that we have observed the opponent play action b for θb times and s for θs times
(in addition to the number of ctitious observations reected in the prior α ), though we do not
observe his card. Note that there are θb + 1 possible ways that he could have played b θb times: 0
times with K and θb with J, 1 time with K and θb − 1 with J, etc. us the expression for p(q |O)
will have θb + 1 terms in it instead of two (we can view θb + 1 as a constant if we assume that the
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number of game iterations is a constant, but in any case this is linear in the number of iterations).
We study generalization to n private information states andm actions in Section 4.3.
We have the new equation
P(q |O) =
∑θb
i=0
∑θs
j=0 q
αKb−1+i
b |K (1 − qb |K )αKs−1+jq
α Jb−1+(θb−i)
b | J (1 − qb | J )α J s−1+(θs−j)
2B(αKb ,αKs )B(α Jb ,α J s )p(O)
Using similar reasoning as above, this gives
P(b |O, J ) =
∑θb
i=0
∑θs
j=0 B(αKb + i,αKs + j)B(α Jb + θb − i + 1,α J s + θs − j)
Z
(2)
e normalization term is
Z =
∑
i
∑
j
[B(αKb + i,αKs + j)B(α Jb + θb − i + 1,α J s + θs − j)
+ B(αKb + i,αKs + j)B(α Jb + θb − i,α J s + θs − j + 1)]
us the algorithm for responding to the opponent is the following. We start with the prior
counters on each private information-action combination, αKb ,αKs , etc. We keep separate counters
θb ,θs for the number of times we have observed each action during play. en we combine these
counters according to Equation 2 in order to compute the strategy for the opponent that is the mean
of the posterior given the prior and observations, and we best respond to this strategy, which gives
us the same payo as best responding to the full posterior distribution according to eorem 2.1.
ere are only O(n2) terms in the expression in Equation 2, so this algorithm is ecient.
4.2 Example
Suppose the prior is that the opponent played b with K 10 times, played s with K 3 times, played b
with J 4 times, and played s with J 9 times. us αKb = 10,αKs = 3,α Jb = 4,α J s = 9. Now suppose
we observe him play b at the next iteration. Applying our algorithm using Equation 1 gives
p(b |O, J ) = B(11, 3)B(5, 9) + B(10, 3)(6, 9)
Z
= 0.00116550 · 0.00015540 + 0.00151515 · 0.00005550 = 2.65209525e
−7
Z
p(s |O, J ) = B(11, 3)B(4, 10) + B(10, 3)(5, 10)
Z
= 0.00116550 · 0.00034965 + 0.00151515 · 0.00009990 = 5.5888056e
−7
Z
−→ p(b |O, J ) = 2.65209525e
−7
2.65209525e−7 + 5.5888056e−7 = 0.3218210361.
So we think that with a jack he is playing a strategy that bets big with probability 0.322 and small
with probability 0.678. Notice that previously we thought his probability of being big with a jack
was 413 = 0.308, and had we been in the seing where we always observe his card aer gameplay
and observed that he had a jack, the posterior probability would be 514 = 0.357.
An alternative “naı¨ve” (and incorrect) approach would be to increment the counter for α Jb by
α Jb
α Jb+αKb
, the ratio of the prior probability that he bets big given J to the total prior probability that
he bets big. is gives a posterior probability of him being big with J of 4+
4
13
14 = 0.308, which
diers signicantly from the correct value. It turns out that this approach is actually equivalent to
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just using the prior:
x + xx+y
x + y + 1 ·
x + y
x + y
=
x(x + y) + x
(x + y + 1)(x + y) =
x(x + y + 1)
(x + y + 1)(x + y) =
x
x + y
4.3 Algorithm for general seing
We now consider the general seing where the opponent can have n dierent states of private
information according to an arbitrary distribution pi and can take m dierent actions. Assume
he is given private information xi with probability pii , for i = 1, . . . ,n, and can take action ki , for
i = 1, . . . ,m. Assume the prior is Dirichlet with parameters αi j for the number of times action j
was played with private information i (so the mean of the prior has the player selecting action kj
at state xi with probability
αi j∑
j αi j
).
P(C = xi ) = pii ;
P(A = kj |C = xi ) = qkj |xi ;
qkj |xi ∼ fDir(qkj |xi ;αi1, . . . ,aim ) =
∏
j q
αi j−1
kj |xi
B(αi1, . . . ,αim )
As before, using Bayes’ rule we have
p(q |O) = P(O |q)p(q)
P(O)
=
∑
i P(O,C = xi |q)p(q)
p(O)
=
∑
i P(O |C = xi ,q)piip(q)
p(O)
=
p(q)∑i P(O |xi ,q)pii
p(O)
=
∑
i P(O |xi )p(q)pii
p(O)
Now assume that action kj∗ was observed in a new time step, while the opponent’s private
information was not observed.
P(q |O) =
∑n
i=1
[
piiqkj∗ |xi
∏m
h=1
∏n
j=1 q
α jh−1
kh |x j
]
p(O)∏ni=1 B(αi1, . . . ,αim)
We now compute the expectation for the posterior probability that the opponent plays kj∗ with
private information xi∗ as done in Section 4.1.
P(A = kj∗ |O,C = xi∗ ) =
∫ [
qk∗j |x ∗i
∑n
i=1
[
piiqkj∗ |xi
∏m
h=1
∏n
j=1 q
α jh−1
kh |x j
] ]
p(O)∏ni=1 B(αi1, . . . ,αim)
=
∑
i
[
pii
∏
j B(γ1j , . . . ,γnj )
]
Z
,
where γi j = αi j + 2 if i = i∗ and j = j∗, γi j = αi j + 1 if j = j∗ and i , i∗, and γi j = αi j otherwise. If
we denote the numerator by τi∗ j∗ then Z =
∑
i∗ τi∗ j∗ . Notice that the product is over n terms, and
therefore the total number of terms will be exponential in n (it is O(m · 2n )).
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For the case of multiple observed actions, the posterior is not Dirichlet and cannot be used
directly as the prior for the next iteration. Suppose we have observed action kj for θ j times (in
addition to the number of ctitious times indicated by the prior counts αi j ). We compute P(q |O)
analogously as
P(q |O) =
∑n
i=1
[
pii
∑
{ρab }
∏m
h=1
∏n
j=1 q
α jh−1+ρ jh
kh |x j
]
p(O)∏ni=1 B(αi1, . . . ,αim) ,
where the
∑
{ρab } is over all values 0 ≤ ρab ≤ θb with
∑
a ρab = θb for each b, for 1 ≤ a ≤ n,
1 ≤ b ≤ m. We can write this as∑
{ρab }
=
θb∑
ρ1b=0
θb−ρ1b∑
ρ2b=0
. . .
θb−∑n−2r=0 ρrb∑
ρn−1,b=0
θb−∑n−1r=0 ρrb∑
ρnb=θb−∑n−2r=0 ρrb .
Here, the expression for the full posterior distribution P(q |O) is
P(q |O) =
∑
i
[
pii
∑
{ρab }
∏
h B(α1h + ρ1h , . . . ,αnh + ρnh)
]
Z
(Note that we could marginalize as before to compute the mean of the posterior strategy for arbitrary
indices iˆ, jˆ, but we omit these details to avoid making the formula unnecessarily complicated.)
For each b, the number of terms equals the number of ways of distributing the θb observations
amongst the n possible private information states, which equals
C(θb + n − 1,n − 1) = (θb + n − 1)!(n − 1)!θb !
Hence the total number of terms in the summation is upper bounded by O
( (T+n)!
n!T !
)
, where T is the
total number of game iterations which upper bounds the θb ’s. Since we must do this for each of the
m actions, the total number of terms is O
(( (T+n)!
n!T !
)m )
. So the number of terms is exponential in
the number of private information states and actions, but polynomial in the number of iterations.
In the following section, we will look at how to compute the product of beta functions for
each term by approximating the product with an exponential of the sum of terms, improving the
computation complexity for both the single and multiple observation seings.
4.4 Calculation for product of beta distributions
From the previous section, we know that the posterior probability that the opponent plays kj∗ with
private information xi∗ is
P(A = kj∗ |O,C = xi∗ ) =
∑
i
[
pii
∏
j B(γ1j , . . . ,γnj )
]
Z
,
One computational boleneck for computing the posterior probability is to compute the product of
beta distributions.
Now we study the product of beta distributions
∏
j B(γ1j , . . . ,γnj ). We will derive an analytical
formula so that evaluation of this formula is computationally feasible.
We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Dene γj =
∑n
i=1 γi j , then dene the empirical probability distribution Pˆj (i) =
γi j∑n
i=1 γi j
=
γi j
γj
. Dene the Gamma function Γ(x) =
∫ ∞
0 x
z−1e−x dx , for integer x , Γ(x) = (x − 1)!. Now
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dene the entropy of Pˆi as E(Pˆj ) = −∑ni=1 Pˆj (i) ln Pˆj (i). en we have
m∏
j=1
B(γ1j , . . . ,γnj ) = exp
(
m∑
j=1
(
−γjE(Pˆj ) − 12 (n − 1) ln(γj ) +
n∑
i=1
ln(Pj (i)) + d
))
.
Here d is a constant such that 12 ln(2pi )n − 1 ≤ d ≤ n − 12 ln(2pi ), where ln(2pi ) ≈ 0.92.
Proof. We know from the denition of beta function that
B(γ1j , . . . ,γnj ) =
∏n
i=1 Γ(γi j )
Γ
(∑n
i=1 γi j
)
Let’s use a version of Stirling’s formula with bounds valid for all positive integers z,
√
2piz
(z
e
)z
≤ Γ(z + 1) = z! ≤ e√z
(z
e
)z
.
erefore, Γ(z + 1) = C(z)√z ( ze )z and C(z) is between √2pi = 2.5066 and e = 2.71828. And since
we want to express the product of Gamma function, we consider
ln Γ(z) = z ln z − z − 12 ln(z) + c(z)
where c(z) is between 12 ln(2pi ) ≈ 0.92 and 1.
Now we can look at the product of beta functions,
m∏
j=1
B(γ1j , . . . ,γnj ) =
m∏
j=1
( ∏n
i=1 Γ(γi j )
Γ
(∑n
i=1 γi j
) )
= exp
(
m∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
ln Γ(γi j ) − ln Γ
(
n∑
i=1
γi j
)))
Now we want to use Stirling’s formula with bounds and the denition of entropy to reduce the
terms in the exponential.
m∑
j=1
( n∑
i=1
ln Γ(γi j ) − ln
(
Γ
( n∑
i=1
γi j
)))
=
m∑
j=1
( n∑
i=1
(
γi j lnγi j − γi j −
ln(γi j )
2 + c(γi j )
)
−
( n∑
i=1
γi j ln
n∑
i=1
γi j −
n∑
i=1
γi j −
ln
(∑
i γi j
)
2 + c
( n∑
i=1
γi j
)))
=
m∑
j=1
( n∑
i=1
γi j
n∑
i=1
γi j∑n
i=1 γi j
ln
(
γi j∑
i γi j
)
− n − 12 ln
( n∑
i=1
γi j
)
+
n∑
i=1
ln
( n∑
i=1
γi j∑
i γi j
)
+
n∑
i=1
c(γi j ) − c
n∑
i=1
γi j
)
=
m∑
j=1
((
−γjE(Pˆj )
)
− 12 (n − 1) ln(γj ) +
n∑
i=1
ln(Pj (i)) +
n∑
i=1
c(γi j ) − c
( n∑
i=1
γi j
))
=
m∑
j=1
((
−γjE(Pˆj )
)
− 12 (n − 1) ln(γj ) +
n∑
i=1
ln(Pj (i)) + d
)
.
Here n 12 ln(2pi ) − 1 ≤ d ≤ n − 12 ln(2pi ).
e rst equation is Stirling’s formula with bounds. e second expands and reorganizes the
terms. e third equation applies the denition γj =
∑n
i=1 γi j , the denition of empirical probability
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distribution Pˆj (i) = γi j∑n
i=1 γi j
, and the denition of entropy for an empirical probability distribution
E(Pˆj ) = −
n∑
i=1
Pˆj (i) ln(Pˆj (i)) = −
n∑
i=1
γi j∑n
i=1 γi j
ln
(
γi j∑n
i=1 γi j
)
.
e fourth equation uses the bound of c(γi j ) between 12 ln(2pi ) and 1 on each constant, to get
1
2 ln(2pi )n − 1 ≤ d ≤ n − 12 ln(2pi ).
erefore, we have
m∏
j=1
B(γ1j , . . . ,γnj )
= exp
(
m∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
ln Γ(γi j ) − ln Γ(
n∑
i=1
γi j )
))
= exp
(
m∑
j=1
((
−γjE(Pˆj )
)
− 12 (n − 1) ln(γj ) +
n∑
i=1
ln(Pj (i)) + d
))

We remark that the approximation is actually prey tight numerically, since in Stirling’s formula,
we get a constant c(z) between 12 ln(2pi ) ≈ 0.92 and 1. And in numerical computation we can
just take 0.92. It would be especially accurate when these γi j are large, since the lower bound
1
2 ln(2pi ) ≈ 0.92 is accurate in the asymptotic version of Stirling’s formula.
Using this formula, we can evaluate P(A = kj∗ |O,C = xi∗ ) eciently. For a single observation,
P(A = kj∗ |O,C = xi∗ ) =
∑
i
[
pii
∏
j B(γ1j , . . . ,γnj )
]
Z
,
=
∑
i
[
pii exp
(∑m
j=1
(
−γjE(Pˆj ) − 12 (n − 1) ln(γj ) +
∑n
i=1 ln(Pj (i)) + d
))]
Z
,
where γi j = αi j + 2 if i = i∗ and j = j∗, γi j = αi j + 1 if j = j∗ and i , i∗, and γi j = αi j otherwise.
And the constant d is chosen by 12 ln(2pi )n − 1 ≤ d ≤ n − 12 ln(2pi ). If we denote the numerator by
τi∗ j∗ then Z =
∑
i∗ τi∗ j∗ .
e complexity for computing this posterior is n times the complexity of computing the terms
inside the exponential. e complexity of that ismn since the computation for entropy is n, and we
sum overm in the outside. erefore, the complexity for computing this posterior is n2m.
Similarly, in the multiple observation case,
P(q |O) =
∑
i
[
pii
∑
{ρ }
∏
h B(γ1j , . . . ,γnj )
]
Z
=
∑
i
[
pii
∑
{ρ } exp
(∑m
j=1
(
−γjE(Pˆj ) − 12 (n − 1) ln(γj ) +
∑n
i=1 ln(Pj (i)) + d
))]
Z
,
where γi j = αi j + ρi j . And
∑
{ρ } is over all values 0 ≤ ρab ≤ θb with
∑
a ρab = θb for each b, for
1 ≤ a ≤ n, 1 ≤ b ≤ m, as ∑
{ρ }
=
θb∑
ρ1b=0
θb−ρ1b∑
ρ2b=0
. . .
θb−∑n−1r=0 ρrb∑
ρnb=0
.
e complexity for computing this posterior is n2m · C(θb + n − 1,n − 1), as the product of
the complexity in the previous case n2m and the number of ways to write θb as nite sums of
Sam Ganzfried and Qingyun Sun 14
observations of at most n buckets, which isC(θb + n − 1,n − 1). If the upper bound on θb is T , then
as we discussed above, the total number of terms in the summation is upper bounded byO
( (T+n)!
n!T !
)
,
where T is the total number of game iterations which upper bounds the θb ’s. And the complexity
of computing this posterior is O
( (T+n)!
n!T ! n
2m
)
. us, overall this approach for computing products
of the beta function leads to an exponential improvement in the running time of the algorithm
for one observation, and reduces the dependence onm for the multiple observation seing from
exponential to linear, though the complexity still remains exponential in n and T for the laer.
5 ALGORITHM FOR UNIFORM PRIOR DISTRIBUTION
Another natural prior that has been studied previously is the uniform distribution over a polyhedron.
is can model the situation when we think the opponent is playing uniformly at random within
some region of a xed strategy, such as a specic Nash equilibrium or a “population mean” strategy
based on historical data. Prior work has used this model to generate a class of opponents who are
signicantly more sophisticated than opponents who play uniformly at random over the entire
space [Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2015]). For example, in rock-paper-scissors, we may think the
opponent is playing a strategy uniformly at random out of strategies that play each action with
probability within [0.31,0.35], as opposed to completely random over [0,1].
Let vi, j denote the jth vertex for player i , where vertices correspond to mixed strategies. Let
p0 denote the prior distribution over vertices, where p0i, j is the probability that player i plays the
strategy corresponding to vertex vi, j . LetVi denote the number of vertices for player i . Algorithm 2
computes the Bayesian best response in this seing. Correctness follows straightforwardly by
applying Corollary 2.2 with the formula for the mean of the uniform distribution.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for opponent exploitation with uniform prior distribution over polyhedron
Inputs: Prior distribution over vertices p0, response functions rt for 0 ≤ t ≤ T
M0 ← strategy prole assuming opponent i plays each vertex vi, j with probability p0i, j = 1Vi
R0 ← r0(M0)
Play according to R0
for t = 1 to T do
for i = 1 to N do
ai ← action taken by player i at time step t
for j = 1 to Vi do
pti, j ← pt−1i, j · vi, j (ai )
Normalize the pti, j ’s so they sum to 1
Mt ← strategy prole assuming opponent i plays each vertex vi, j with probability pti, j
Rt ← rt (Mt )
Play according to Rt
6 EXPERIMENTS
We ran experiments on the game described in Section 4.1. For the beta function computations we
used the Colt Java math library.5 For our rst set of experiments we tested our basic algorithm
which assumes that we observe a single opponent action (Equation 1). We varied the Dirichlet prior
5hps://dst.lbl.gov/ACSSoware/colt/
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parameters to be uniform in {1,n} to explore the runtime as a function of the size of the prior (since
computing larger values of the eta function can be challenging). e results (Table 1) show that the
computation is very fast even for large n, with running time under 8 microseconds for n = 500.
However, we also observe frequent numerical instability for large n. e second row shows the
percentage of the trials for which the algorithm produced a result of “NaN” (which typically results
from dividing zero by zero). is jumps from 0% for n = 50 to 8.8% for n = 100 to 86.9% for n = 200.
is is due to instability of algorithms for computing the beta function. We used to our knowledge
the best publicly available beta function solver, but perhaps there could be a dierent solver that
leads to beer performance in our seing (e.g., it trades o runtime for additional precision). In
any case, despite the cases of instability, the results indicate that the algorithm runs extremely fast
for hundreds of prior observations, and since it is exact, it is the best algorithm for the seings
in which it produces a valid output. Note that n = 100 corresponds to 400 prior observations on
average since there are four parameters, and that the experiments in previous work used a horizon
of 200 hands played in a match against an opponent [Southey et al., 2005].
n 10 20 50 100 200 500
Time 0.0005 0.0008 0.0018 0.0025 0.0034 0.0076
NaN 0 0 0 0.0883 0.8694 0.9966
Table 1. Results of modifying Dirichlet parameters to be U{1,n} over one million samples. First row is average
runtime in milliseconds. Second row is percentage of the trials that output “NaN.”
We tested our generalized algorithm from Equation 2 for dierent numbers of observations,
keeping the prior xed. We used a Dirichlet prior with all parameters equal to 2 as has been done
in prior work [Southey et al., 2005]. We observe (Table 2) that the algorithm runs quickly for large
numbers of observations, though again it runs into numerical instability for large values. As one
example, the algorithm runs in 19 milliseconds for θb = 101, θs = 100.
n 10 20 50 100 200 500 1000
Time 0.015 0.03 0.36 2.101 10.306 128.165 728.383
NaN 0 0 0 0 0.290 0.880 0.971
Table 2. Results using Dirichlet prior with all parameters equal to 2 and θb , θs in U{1,n} averaged over 1,000
samples. First row is average runtime in milliseconds, second row is percentage of trials that produced “NaN.”
We compared our algorithm against the three heuristics described in previous work [Southey
et al., 2005]. e rst heuristic Bayesian Best Response (BBR) approximates the opponent’s strategy
by sampling strategies according to the prior and computing the mean of the posterior over these
samples, then best-responding to this mean strategy. eir Max A Posteriori Response heuristic
(MAP) samples strategies from the prior, computes the posterior value for these strategies, and plays
a best response to the one with highest posterior value. ompson’s Response samples strategies
from the prior, computes the posterior values, then samples one strategy for the opponent from
these posteriors and plays a best response to it. For all approaches we used a Dirichlet prior with
the standard values of 2 for all parameters. For all the sampling approaches we sampled 1,000
strategies from the prior for each opponent and used these strategies for all hands against that
opponent (as was done in prior work [Southey et al., 2005]). Note that one can draw samples
6hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirichlet distribution#Random number generation
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x1, . . . ,xK from a Dirichlet distribution by rst drawing K independent samples y1, . . . ,yK from
Gamma distributions each with density Gamma(αi , 1) = y
αi −1
i e
−yi
Γ(αi ) and then seing xi =
yi∑
j yj
.6
We also compared against the payo of a full best response strategy that knows the actual mixed
strategy of the opponent, not just a distribution over his strategies, as well as the Nash equilibrium
strategy.7 Note that the game has a value to us (player 2) of -0.75, so negative values are not
necessarily indicative of “losing.”
Table 3 shows that our exact Bayesian best response algorithm (EBBR) outperforms the heuristic
approaches, as expected since it is optimal when the opponent’s strategy is drawn from the prior
(though performance is very similar to BBR and not statistically distinguishable until 25 iterations).
BBR performed best out of the sampling approaches, which is not surprising because it is trying
to approximate the optimal approach while the others are optimizing a dierent objective. All of
the sampling approaches outperformed just following the Nash equilibrium, and as expected all
exploitation approaches performed worse than playing a best response to the opponent’s actual
strategy. Note that, against an opponent drawn from a Dirichlet distribution with all parameters
equal to 2 and no further observations of his play, our best response would be to always call, which
gives us expected payo of zero. us for the initial column the actual value for EBBR when
averaged over all opponents would be zero. Against this distribution the Nash equilibrium has
expected payo −0.375.
Algorithm Initial 10 25
EBBR −0.00003 ± 0.0003 −0.0004 ± 0.0009 0.0002 ± 0.0008
BBR −0.00003 ± 0.0003 −0.0004 ± 0.0009 −0.0065 ± 0.0008
MAP −0.1649 ± 0.0002 −0.2025 ± 0.0007 −0.2664 ± 0.0007
ompson −0.2098 ± 0.0002 −0.2224 ± 0.0007 −0.2996 ± 0.0007
FullBR 0.4975 ± 0.0002 0.4971 ± 0.0006 0.4978 ± 0.0005
Nash −0.3750 ± 0.0000 −0.3749 ± 0.0001 −0.3751 ± 0.0001
Table 3. Comparison with algorithms from prior work, full best response, and Nash equilibrium using Dirichlet
prior with parameters equal to 2. Sampling algorithms use 1000 samples. For initial column we sampled 100
million opponents from the prior, for 10 rounds we sampled one million, and for 25 rounds 500,000. Results
are average winrate per hand over all opponents with 95% confidence intervals.
On the positive side the exploitation approaches (particularly EBBR and BBR) are able to signi-
cantly outperform the Nash equilibrium strategy when given access to a reliable prior distribution;
however, none of them are able to improve over time as a result of additional observations (EBBR
and BBR perform around the same with more observations while ompson and MAP perform
noticeably worse). is indicates that, for this seing at least, just observing the opponent’s public
action and not private information is not additionally useful in comparison to the performance
variance and the noise introduced from sampling. In order to successfully learn beyond the prior
in imperfect-information seings, algorithms will need access to some of the opponents’ private
information. Previous experiments had also shown that when the sampling approaches are played
against opponents drawn from the prior, the winning rates converge, typically very quickly (even
with access to the opponent’s private information in certain hands that went to showdown): “e
7Note that the Nash equilibrium for player 2 is to call a big bet with probability 14 and a small bet with probability 1 (the
equilibrium for player 1 is to always bet big with a king and to bet big with probability 56 with a jack).
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independent Dirichlet prior is very broad, admiing a wide variety of opponents. It is encourag-
ing that the Bayesian approach is able to exploit even this weak information to achieve a beer
result.” [Southey et al., 2005]
We also tested the eect of using only 10 samples of the opponent’s strategy for the sampling
approaches. e approaches would then have a noisier estimate of the opponent’s strategy and
should achieve lower performance against the actual strategy, though run signicantly faster.
Alg Initial 10 25 100
EBBR .0001 ± .0003 -.0003 ± .0003 .0002 ± .0002 -.0014 ± .0005
BBR -.0662 ± .0003 -.0902 ± .0003 -.1634 ± .0002 -.3127 ± .0004
MAP -.1699 ± .0002 -.2060 ± .0002 -.2657 ± .0001 -.3082 ± .0004
ompson -.2118 ± .0002 -.2247 ± .0002 -.2844 ± .0001 -.3725 ± .0004
FullBR .4976 ± .0002 .4973 ± .0002 .4975 ± .0001 .4969 ± .0003
Nash -.3750 ± .0000 -.3750 ± .0000 -.3750 ± .0000 -.3750 ± .0001
Table 4. Comparison of our algorithm with algorithms from prior work (BBR, MAP, Thompson), full best
response, and Nash equilibrium using Dirichlet prior with parameters equal to 2. The sampling algorithms
each use 10 samples from the opponent’s strategy (as opposed to 1000 samples from our earlier analysis). For
the initial column we sampled 100 million opponents from the prior, for 10 and 25 rounds we sampled ten
million, and 300,000 for 100 rounds.
ompson and MAP performed very similarly using 10 vs. 1000 samples (these approaches
essentially end up selecting a single strategy from the set of samples to be used as the model, and
the results indicate that they are relatively insensitive to the number of samples used), but BBR
performs signicantly worse. While the performance between EBBR and BBR was statistically
indistinguishable for 1000 samples, EBBR signicantly outperforms BBR with 10 samples, particu-
larly for more iterations. As before the sampling approaches seem to actually perform worse over
time as the noise propagates, while the performance of EBBR remains about the same. e dropo
of BBR is particularly signicant. e results indicate that EBBR would be particularly preferable
over the sampling approaches if the number of available samples is small (e.g., due to running time
considerations) and as the number of game iterations increases (though eventually EBBR can run
into numerical stability issues described earlier).
7 CONCLUSION
One of the most fundamental problems in game theory is learning to play optimally against
opponents who may make mistakes. We presented the rst exact algorithm for performing ex-
ploitation in imperfect-information games in the Bayesian seing using the most well-studied
prior distribution for this problem, the Dirichlet distribution. Previously an exact algorithm had
only been presented for normal-form games, and the best previous algorithm was a heuristic with
no guarantees. We demonstrated experimentally that our algorithm can be practical and that it
outperforms the best prior approaches, though it can run into numerical stability issues for large
numbers of observations.
We presented a general meta-algorithm and new theoretical framework for studying opponent
exploitation. Future work can extend our analysis to many important seings. For example, we
would like to study the seing when the opponent’s private information is only sometimes observed
(we expect our approach can be extended easily to this seing) and general sequential games where
the agents can take multiple actions (which we expect to be hard, as indicated by the analysis in
the tech report). We would also like to extend analysis for any number of agents. Our algorithm is
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not specialized for two-player zero-sum games (it applies to general-sum games); if we are able to
compute the mean of the posterior strategy against multiple opponent agents, then best responding
to this strategy prole is just a single agent optimization and can be done in time linear in the
size of the game regardless of the number of opponents. While the Dirichlet is the most natural
prior for this problem, we would also like to study other important distributions. We presented an
algorithm for the uniform prior distribution over a polyhedron, which could model the situation
where we think the opponent is playing a strategy from a uniform distribution in a region around a
particular strategy, such as a specic equilibrium or a “population mean” based on historical data.
Opponent exploitation is a fundamental problem, and our algorithm and extensions could be
applicable to many domains that are modeled as an imperfect-information games. For example,
many security game models have imperfect information, e.g., [Kiekintveld et al., 2010, Letchford
and Conitzer, 2010], and opponent exploitation in security games has been a very active area of
study, e.g., [Nguyen et al., 2013, Pita et al., 2010]. It has also been proposed recently that opponent
exploitation can be important in medical treatment [Sandholm, 2015].
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